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Abstract
I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in
charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a
safe project generating a ￿xed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain
revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each
project but also about the signal regarding the pro￿tability of the risky project. If
the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, inte-
grating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared
to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if
it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is
type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives,w h i c hc a nm a k ea
bias toward either project optimal. Our results can oﬀer an explanation for why
good ￿rms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating
decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.
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In many buyer-seller relationships, the buyer relies on the seller to obtain information
that allows her to evaluate diﬀerent alternatives. Furthermore, in these situations, the
seller is likely to have private information about the cost of providing each alternative
product. For instance, in military procurement, the Department of Defense would be
less well informed not only about the cost of producing each weapon system but also
about its eﬀectiveness than the ￿rm producing the weapons.1 Other examples include
the relationship between a patient and a doctor, a victim and a lawyer, a driver and a
motor mechanic, a person who wants to build a house and an architect etc. A similar
situation can arise inside ￿rms between shareholders and a manager (or between a CEO
and a division manager) when the former has to choose among alternative projects but
has to resort to the latter, who is in charge of production, for the information necessary
to evaluate the projects.
In this paper, I study the optimal project choice when the principal should rely on
the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. In the model, which is tailored
to situations arising in organizations, the principal has to choose between a safe project
generating a ￿xed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. I focus
on analyzing how integrating production and project evaluation tasks aﬀects the agent￿s
incentive to transmit the information about the pro￿tability of the risky project.2 For this
purpose, I make a conceptual distinction between two kinds of information that the agent
can possess: information about the parameter which directly determines his3 payoﬀ (i.e.
his type or productive eﬃciency) and other information relevant for the decision making
of his organization (i.e. the signal about the pro￿tability of the risky project). The main
diﬀerence between the two kinds of information is that private knowledge of the former
can generate an information rent while private knowledge of the latter alone does not
generate any rent. Therefore, the agent can be strategic in transmitting the latter when
this aﬀects his information rent accruing from the former. This interplay between the two
kinds of information captures what happens in all the examples that I mentioned in the
1The following statements of defense contractors about Department of Defense oﬃcials are striking:
￿We have the technical superiority and are on the oﬀensive. We spoon-feed them. We ultimately try to
load them with our own ideas and designs (Leitzel, 1991).￿
2Distortions in bottom-up information ￿ows are emphasized by Simon (1961) as a major problem of
hierarchies and information withholding is well documented by sociologists like Crozier (1967) and Dalton
(1959).
3Throughout the paper, I use ￿she￿ for the principal and ￿he￿ for the agent.
1￿rst paragraph.
In the model, the agent is risk neutral and has private information about his type. He
can have either a high-cost or a low-cost type and his production cost depends on the type
and the project retained and therefore is his private information. His reservation utility is
normalized to zero for both types. The signal about the pro￿tability of the risky project
is soft information and can be either high or low. As a benchmark, I consider the case
in which the principal herself receives the signal. In this benchmark, it is optimal for the
principal to choose the risky project if and only if the signal is high and the high signal is
called good news (bad news) from the agent￿s point of view if his information rent under
the risky project is weakly larger (smaller) than the one under the safe project.
The mechanism design problem under task integration is a two-dimensional screening
problem. It turns out that the agent￿s incentive to transmit the signal crucially depends on
whether the high signal is good or bad news. If it is good news, task integration does not
generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal receives the signal.
By contrast, if it is bad news, the principal can never achieve the pro￿t of the benchmark
under task integration. In particular, even though the agent￿s outside opportunity is the
same regardless of the type, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility
which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives.T h i sr a i s e st h e
cost of obtaining the signal to make the right project choice and therefore can make
introducing a bias toward either the safe project or the risky project optimal.
To provide an intuition about the countervailing incentives that arise when the high
signal is bad news, I consider the case in which the principal chooses the risky project if
and only if the agent reports a high signal. First, an agent who received a low signal has
no incentive to report a high signal since the realization of the revenue under the risky
project depends on the true signal and, by making the transfer depend on the revenue, the
principal can test whether or not the agent transmits the true signal. Second, an agent
who received a high signal might have an incentive to report a low signal. Upon receiving
a low signal, the principal chooses the safe project and cannot test whether the agent
reports the true signal since the revenue under the safe project is constant. Therefore,
the utility that an agent can obtain by reporting a low signal becomes an endogenous
reservation utility. This reservation utility is type-dependent and only the low-cost type
has a (strictly) positive reservation utility. Third, in order to induce the low-cost type who
received a high signal to report the true signal, the principal should give him at least the
reservation utility. This implies that the expected transfer that the low-cost type receives
under the risky project must be larger than the production cost of a high-cost type; for
2instance, if the transfer under the risky project is just equal to a high-cost type￿s cost, the
low-cost type￿s rent is smaller under the risky project than under the safe project (this
is because we consider the case in which the high signal is bad news) that and therefore
will always report a low signal. Finally, this in turn creates countervailing incentives such
that a high-cost type who received a high signal can get a positive information rent by
pretending to have a low-cost type and reporting the true signal.
The results under task integration have interesting implications. For instance, suppose
that in addition to the agent who can have either a low-cost or a high-cost type, there is
another agent whose cost is known to the principal4 and is strictly higher than the high-
cost type￿s cost under each of the two projects. The ￿rst agent is called a good agent and
the second a bad agent. The principal knows whether an agent is good or bad although
the good agent￿s type is private information. Then, when a project is given, obviously,
the principal strictly prefers the good agent to the bad one. However, when the project
choice is endogenous and the principal has to resort to the agent in charge of production
for the signal allowing her to evaluate the risky project, surprisingly, the expected pro￿t
can be higher when the agent is bad than when the agent is good. This result suggests
that a ￿rm with inferior technology can have a higher expected pro￿tt h a na￿rm with
superior technology and therefore provides an explanation for why good ￿rms can go bad.
We can interpret the safe project as a current project which generates a ￿xed revenue and
the risky project as a new project generating an uncertain revenue. If a ￿rm￿s division
has some vested interest (or a large rent) attached to the current project, the ￿rm can
suﬀer from distortions in information ￿ows and fail to adapt its project (or core-activity)
to the changes in business environment. Furthermore, it is natural to expect that the
rent that the division obtains from the current project increases as the current project
is more successful, implying that a ￿rm with superior technology might suﬀer more from
distortions in information ￿ows than a ￿rm with inferior technology when the changes
in business environment are adverse to the current project. In this sense, my results
suggest that today￿s success may plant a seed for tomorrow￿s failure as is illustrated by
my examples of IBM and Kmart later on.5
Under task separation, there are two agents: one charged with production and the
other with transmitting the signal. As the former does not take into account the ex-
4The argument in this paragraph holds even though each agent￿s cost is unknown: see proposition 5.
5Bower and Christensen (1995) give many examples of leading companies who failed to stay at the
top of their industries when markets changes and provide an explanation of the phenomena. My paper
oﬀers an alternative explanation.
3ternalities which he in￿icts on the latter, information ￿ows better under task separation
than under integration. This oﬀers a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating
decisions from long-term strategic decisions, which is emphasized as the main feature of
M-form structure by Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975). According to them, the
separation is a response to the problem raised by U-form structure in which functional
executives took both responsibilities and thus became advocates representing the interests
of their respective divisions.
I also analyze the case in which the principal cannot commit in advance to a mechanism
to induce the agent to transmit the signal about the pro￿tability of the risky project.
Therefore, in this case, the agent decides which signal to release before receiving the
principal￿s oﬀer. I ￿nd that if the signal is good news, there is an equilibrium in which
the agent always truthfully transmits the signal while if the signal is bad news, such an
equilibrium never exists and the distortions in project choice are more severe than the
distortions that arise when the principal has commitment power.
Countervailing incentives are studied in the mechanism design literature on type-
dependent reservation utility (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Maggi and Rodriguez 1995,
Jullien 2000). In our model, the agent has the same zero reservation utility regardless of
type. However, the fact that the principal has to rely on the agent for the signal justifying
the choice of the risky project makes his utility under the safe project play the role of an
endogenous type-dependent reservation utility.
In the literature on multi-dimensional screening (Armstrong 1996 , Armstrong and
Rochet 1999, Chone and Rochet 1998, Rochet and Stole 2003), to the best of my knowl-
edge, they have not made the distinction between two kinds of information depending on
whether or not its private knowledge generates an information rent and hence have not
studied the interplay between the two. Furthermore, I show that depending on whether
a signal is good or bad news from the agent￿s point of view, the nature of the binding
incentive constraints dramatically changes.
Lambert (1986) studies how risk aversion aﬀects the agent￿s incentive to invest in
generating information about the pro￿tability of projects and to select the best project.
By contrast, in my paper, the agent is risk neutral, the precision of the signal is given
and there is no delegation of project choice. Hirao (1994) studies when it is optimal to
assign both project evaluation and operation tasks to the same agent in a moral hazard
setting with limited liability in which the principal faces the choice between a safe project
and a risky one. Since eﬀort is not necessary for the safe one, given a project choice, the
agent in charge of operation can get a rent only with the risky one and consequently has
4a preference for it. He shows that task separation is optimal when the accuracy of the
signal is exogenous. Although the intuition underlying the superiority of task separation
o v e rt a s ki n t e g r a t i o nt h a tt h ea g e n ti nc h a r g eo fe v a l u a t i o nd o e sn o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
the externalities that he in￿icts on the agent in charge of operation is present in Hirao
(1994) (and also in Lewis and Sappington, 1997), my analysis of the task integration,
which is the main focus of the paper, is very diﬀerent from his (and from theirs). My
m o d e li sa na d v e r s es e l e c t i o nm o d e la n dId i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e ng o o da n db a dn e w sa n d
show that contrary to Hirao (1994), when the signal favoring the selection of the risky
project is good news from the agent￿s point of view, there is no loss from task integration
while there is a loss in the case of bad news. In Lewis and Sappington (1997), the agent
should be induced to incur a cost to discover his type under task integration while that
information will be acquired by the agent in charge of planning under task separation. By
contrast, I assume that the agent knows his type from the beginning and show that if he
knows, in addition, the signal on the pro￿tability of the project, countervailing incentives
can arise.6
My paper is also related to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). They oﬀer an argument
favoring advocacy over nonpartisanship: a nonpartisan￿s incentives are impaired by his
pursuing several con￿icting objectives at the same time. This argument is similar to the
intuition underlying the result that the signal is transmitted better under task separation
than under task integration. However, their result is derived from a contractual incom-
pleteness in that they assume that the principal cannot base rewards on information but
only on ￿nal decisions. Indeed, in their paper, if rewards can be based on information,
there is no need for advocacy. In our model, direct rewards based on information are
allowed.7
6Levitt and Snyder (1997) also study the interaction between work incentive and the incentive to
transmit information about the pro￿tability of a project. In their setting, after exerting work eﬀort, the
agent receives a signal about the pro￿tability of the on-going project, which the principal can use to
decide to cancel the project. They show that cancellation undermines work incentive since it obscures
the linkage between eﬀort and outcomes. In our model, no such linkage exists since the agent incurs the
production cost after transmitting the signal.
7There exist other papers on informational integration versus separation. Baron and Besanko (1992)
and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) show in the context of regulation of complementary products that the
former dominates the latter. On the contrary, Laﬀont and Martimort (1999) show that separation of
regulators dominates integration in dealing with the threat of regulatory capture. These papers basically
compare the case in which one agent knows two cost parameters with the case in which each agent knows
only one cost parameter and therefore do not make qualitative distiction between cost information and
the information regarding the pro￿tability of a project.
5The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
case of task integration; after de￿ning the principal￿s optimization problem, I ￿rst analyze
t h ec a s eo fg o o dn e w sa n dt h e nt h ec a s eo fb a dn e w s .S e c t i o n4s t u d i e st h ec a s ew i t h o u t
commitment. Section 5 discusses some implications of the results. Section 6 provides the
conclusion. All the proofs that are not provided in the main text are relegated to the
Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Projects, tasks and technology
The principal chooses a project denoted by j; she has to choose between a safe project
(j = S) and a risky project (j = R). The safe project always generates a ￿xed level of
revenue yS. The risky project can generate either a high revenue yR = yH or a low revenue
yR = yL with yH >y L and yS 6= yR for yR = yH,y L. In the absence of any signal about
yR, the probability of having yR = yH, denoted by ￿, is assumed to be equal to 1
2 for
simplicity.
To realize a project, the principal needs to employ an agent who is in charge of pro-
duction. In addition to the production task, the agent can have the task of transmitting
a signal about the likelihood of having yR = yH. We distinguish task integration from
task separation. When the principal contracts only one agent for both tasks, tasks are
integrated. By contrast, when the principal contracts one agent for production and an-
other agent to get a signal about yR, tasks are separated. Before the principal oﬀers
her contract, the agent in charge of production discovers his type θ, which represents his
productive eﬃciency. He has a low-cost type (θ = θ) with probability ν ∈ (0,1) and a
high-cost type (θ = θ) with probability 1 − ν in the following sense; his cost of produc-
tion, denoted by C(θ,j),d e p e n d so nt h et y p ea n dt h ep r o j e c tc h o s e nb yt h ep r i n c i p a l
such that ∆Cj ≡ C(θ,j)−C(θ,j) > 0 for j ∈ {S,R}. The agent￿s type and consequently
his production cost are his private information. The distribution of the type is common
knowledge.
2.2 Information about the risky project
The agent in charge of transmitting the signal about the pro￿tability of the risky project,
denoted by σ, receives either σ = H or σ = L. The probability of receiving σ conditional
6on the true state of the world is given as follows:
yR = yH yR = yL
σ = H ξ 1 − ξ
σ = L 1 − ξ ξ
where ξ ∈ (1/2,1]. Hence, the probability of having yR = yH conditional on σ, denoted
by ￿σ,i sg i v e nb y :
￿L =1− ξ <￿=
1
2
<￿ H = ξ.
I assume that σ is soft information in that the agent can pretend to have received any
of the two signals. σ is the agent￿s private information and its distribution is common
knowledge.
2.3 Utilities and mechanism
The principal is risk neutral and her pro￿t is equal to the revenue minus the transfer
made to the agent. I assume that the revenue is contractible and therefore the transfer
can depend on the level of revenue. The agent is risk neutral and his utility is equal to the
transfer from the principal minus the production cost. His reservation utility is normalized
to zero regardless of type. I assume that the agent has the option of terminating his
relationship with the principal at any timeb e f o r ei n c u r r i n gt h ep r o d u c t i o nc o s t 8.T h i s
limited liability assumption makes selling the project to the agent suboptimal. I also
assume that it is never optimal for the principal to induce the agent not to produce (i.e.
shutdown is never optimal).
According to the revelation principle, I can restrict my attention, without loss of
generality, to the set of direct revelation mechanisms;
n
p(b σ,b θ),t(b σ,b θ,y)
o
,




)r e p r e -
sents the agent￿s report about the type and y ∈
'
yS,yH,yL“
. p(•) is the probability of
c h o o s i n gt h es a f ep r o j e c t ,1−p(•) is the probability of choosing the risky project and t(•)
is the transfer to the agent which depends on the realized revenue y.
8Limits on termination penalties are common in practice (Sappington 1983 and Lewis and Sappington
1997). The assumption is needed also to exclude a trivial solution, which is not realistic, to achieve under
task integration the outcome of the benchmark: see the remark in section 2.5 regarding what happens in
an alternative timing without the limit on termination penalty.
72.4 The main assumption and good and bad news
Consider as a benchmark the case in which the principal herself obtains σ.I n o r d e r t o
avoid the problem of informed principal, which is not the focus of the paper, I assume
that σ becomes public information. Then, if θ is known to the principal, she chooses the
safe project if and only if yS − C(θ,S) >￿ σyH +( 1− ￿σ)yL − C(θ,R) holds. If θ is
the agent￿s private information, the agent can get an information rent and as usual the
principal should make decision in terms of the virtual cost. Let Cν(θ,j) denote the virtual
cost: we have Cν(θ,j) ≡ C(θ,j) and Cν(θ,j) ≡ C(θ,j)+ ν
1−ν∆Cj. In what follows, I
make the following assumption:
A1: ￿HyH +(1−￿H)yL −Cν(θ,R) >y S −Cν(θ,S) >￿ LyH +(1−￿L)yL −Cν(θ,R)
for θ ∈ Θ.
The ￿rst inequality of A1 (respectively, the second inequality of A1) means that the
principal ￿nds it optimal to choose the risky project (respectively, the safe project) for
both types when she receives σ = H (respectively, σ = L) when the agent has private
information on θ. Furthermore, A1 implies that the principal will make the same project
choice even when she has complete information on θ. A 1i sc h o s e ni no r d e rt oi d e n t i f y
the distortions in project choice arising from task integration.
Suppose that the cost diﬀerential between the two types is larger under the safe project
than under the risky project (∆CS > ∆CR). Then, in the benchmark in which the
principal receives σ, A1 implies that the low-cost type gets a larger information rent
when σ = L than when σ = H. Therefore, we can regard σ = H as bad news from the
low-cost type￿s point of view. By contrast, when ∆CS < ∆CR, σ = H is good news from
the low-cost type￿s point of view. Since the high-cost type gets zero rent anyway when the
principal herself receives σ,Ic a ns a yt h a tσ = H is bad news (good news)i f∆CS > ∆CR
(∆CS < ∆CR) in a weak sense from the agent￿s point of view.
2.5 Timing
The timing under task integration is given as follows:
1. The agent discovers both θ and σ before receiving the contract from the principal.
2. The principal proposes a contract.
3. The agent accepts or rejects it. If the agent rejects it, the following stages do not
occur.
4. The agent reports (b σ,b θ) to the principal.
85. The principal chooses a project according to the rule speci￿ed by the contract.
6. The agent decides whether or not to continue the relationship with the principal.
If he decides to discontinue the relationship, he gets the reservation utility normalized at
zero and the game ends; otherwise, he incurs the production cost.
7. The revenue is realized and the transfer is made.
Note that the agent will incur the cost only if his expected payoﬀ upon incurring the
cost is positive. As long as the agent has the incentive to continue the relationship at stage
6, the agent will accept the contract at stage 3. Hence, what matters is the participation
at stage 6 not the one at stage 3. Because of this, whether the agent discovers θ and σ
before or after the principal￿s oﬀer is not relevant for the results.
Remark: If the penalty for terminating the relationship is large enough that the agent
cannot quit the relationship at stage 6 if he accepted the principal￿s oﬀer at stage 3, then
I can show that the Supremum of the principal￿s expected pro￿t under task integration
is equal to the one in the benchmark in which the principal receives the signal σ since
the principal can destroy the agent￿s incentive to manipulate σ by choosing the risky
project with probability ε(> 0) small enough and making the transfer depend on the
match between the reported signal and the realized revenue.
2.6 Benchmark of task separation
Consider as another benchmark the case of task separation; there are two agents (agent 1
and agent 2) such that agent 1 is charged with production while agent 2 is charged with
transmitting the signal σ. The timing under task separation is similar to the one de￿ned
in section 2.4. Agent 1 privately discovers θ and agent 2 privately discovers σ before
receiving the principal￿s oﬀer of a mechanism which speci￿es the probability of choosing
each project and the transfer made to each agent as functions of the agents￿ reports. After
each agent accepts the oﬀer, each agent reports his information.
It is clear that since agent 2 has no vested interest in any of the two projects, he
will report truthfully σ even though the principal does not make any compensation.9
Therefore, under task separation, the principal can achieve the outcome that she achieves
when she herself receives σ.
9Although the principal can make her transfer to agent 2 contingent on the realization of revenue, she
does not need to use such contingent transfers to induce his truth-telling under the standard tie-breaking
rule that the agent tells the truth if he is indiﬀerent.
9￿ Observation 1: Under task separation, the principal can achieve the outcome that
she achieves when she herself receives σ.
Although this benchmark of task separation is highly stylized (and I will discuss draw-
backs of task separation in section 5), it captures a very important property of σ:t h e
information σ is very diﬀerent from the information θ in that private knowledge of the
former alone does not generate any information rent while private knowledge of the second
can generate an information rent. This is why agent 2 is not strategic in transmitting σ.
In the next section, I focus on how task integration aﬀects agent 1￿s incentive to transmit
σ and thereby the principal￿s project choice.
3T a s k I n t e g r a t i o n
I ￿rst de￿ne the principal￿s optimization problem under task integration. According to
the revelation principle, without loss of generality, I can restrict my attention to the set
of direct revelation mechanisms:
n
p(b σ,b θ),t(b σ,b θ,y)
o
.
In order to induce the agent to incur the production cost, the following (ex post)
individual rationality constraint should be satis￿ed after the project choice is made:
(IR : σ,θ,S) U(σ,θ,S) ≡ t(σ,θ,y
S) − C(θ,S) ≥ 0; (1)
(IR : σ,θ,R) U(σ,θ,R) ≡ ￿σt(σ,θ,y
H)+( 1− ￿σ)t(σ,θ,y
L) − C(θ,R) ≥ 0. (2)
For expositional simplicity, I introduce the following notation regarding the agent￿s utility:
V (b σ,b θ : σ,θ) ≡ p(b σ,b θ)max
n
0,t(b σ,b θ,y S) − C(θ,S)
o
+(1 − p(b σ,b θ))max
n




U(σ,θ) ≡ V (σ,θ : σ,θ). (4)
Although the individual rationality constraint is satis￿ed when (b σ,b θ)=( σ,θ),i tm a yn o t
be satis￿ed when (b σ,b θ) 6=( σ,θ); V (b σ,b θ : σ,θ) t a k e st h i si n t oa c c o u n t .
10To induce truth-telling, the mechanism should satisfy the following incentive compat-
ibility constraints:
(IC :( σ,θ) → (b σ,b θ)) U(σ,θ) ≥ V (b σ,b θ : σ,θ) for all (σ,b σ) ∈ {H,L}
2 and (θ,b θ) ∈ Θ
2.
(5)
The principal￿s program, denoted by P,i sg i v e nb y :
max
p(σ,θ),t(σ,θ,y)
E [π]=νE(π | θ)+( 1− ν)E(π | θ)
subject to (1) to (5),
where













































P is a two-dimensional screening program. Observe ￿rst that in the benchmark in
which the principal herself receives the signal σ,o n l y(IR : σ,θ,j) and (IC :( σ,θ) →
(σ,b θ)) need to be satis￿ed. Since the incentive constraints that need to be satis￿ed in the
benchmark is a strict subset of the incentive constraints that need to be satis￿ed under
task integration, I have the following observation.
￿ Observation 2: The principal￿s expected payoﬀ under task integration cannot be
higher than the one in the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the
signal σ (and therefore the one under task separation).
In what follows, I analyze ￿rst the case in which σ = H is good news (∆CS ≤ ∆CR)
a n dt h e nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hσ = H is bad news (∆CS > ∆CR).
3.1 When σ = H is good news (∆CS ≤ ∆CR)
Consider now the case in which σ = H is good news (i.e. ∆CS ≤ ∆CR). The following
proposition shows that in this case, the principal can achieve under task integration the
outcome of the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal σ.
11Proposition 1 When σ = H is good news (i.e. ∆CS ≤ ∆CR),u n d e rA 1 ,t h ep r i n c i p a l
can achieve under task integration the outcome of the benchmark in which the principal
herself receives the signal σ.






Then, U(H,θ)=U(L,θ)=0and U(L,θ)=V (L,θ;L,θ)=∆CS and U(H,θ)=
V (H,θ;H,θ)=∆CR. Obviously, an agent with σ = H has no strict incentive to re-
port σ = L. Furthermore, by choosing t(H,θ,y H) large enough and t(H,θ,y L) small
enough, the principal can destroy the agent￿s incentive to manipulate σ from L to H at
no cost.
The intuition of the result in Proposition 1 is the following. If the principal chooses
under task integration the same project as in the benchmark in which the principal herself
receives the signal σ and just makes the transfer of each agent equal to the high-cost type￿s
cost, a low-cost type gets a rent equal to ∆CR when σ = H and ∆CS when σ = L by
reporting truthfully. This might create an incentive for a low-cost type with σ = L to
announce σ = H. However, since ￿H >￿ L holds, by increasing t(H,θ,yH) and reducing
t(H,θ,y L), the principal can test whether or not the agent reports the true signal and
destroy the agent￿s incentive to manipulate the signal from L to H at no cost.10 By
contrast, this strategy does not work when σ = H is bad news (i.e. ∆CS > ∆CR)). Then,
under the same mechanism, a low-cost type has an incentive to manipulate the signal
from H to L since the principal cannot test whether or not the agent reports the true
signal as the revenue under the safe project is constant.
3.2 When σ = H is bad news (∆CS > ∆CR)
I now consider the case in which σ = H is bad news (∆CS > ∆CR).L e m m a1i d e n t i ￿es
some monotonicity constraints that the optimal contract should satisfy.
Lemma 1 (monotonicity constraints) Under A1 and ∆CS > ∆CR, the optimal contract
satis￿es the following monotonicity constraints, denoted by M;
(i) p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ) for σ = H,L.
(ii) p(L,θ) ≥ p(H,θ).
10This result is similar to the ￿ndings of Riordan and Sappington (1988) and CrØmer and McLean
(1988).
12The monotonicity constraint with respect to the type (i.e. θ) is easily derived by adding
the incentive constraints (IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) and (IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)). However, the
other monotonicity constraint p(L,θ) ≥ p(H,θ) cannot be easily derived in a similar way
since the true signal σ aﬀects the expected transfer from ￿H >￿ L.L e t M denote the
monotonicity constraints in Lemma 1 (i) and (ii).
Binding constraints given {p(σ,θ)}
In what follows, I ￿rst characterize diﬀerent regimes according to the binding con-
straints when {p(σ,θ)} is given. However, from Lemma 1, I will consider only {p(σ,θ)}
that satis￿es the monotonicity constraints M. The next lemma characterizes the regime
in which task integration does not aﬀect the nature of the binding incentive constraints
with respect to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives σ in that only
(IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) matters among the incentive constraints; I call it the regular regime.
Let










∆CR = V (L,θ;H,θ),t h e
following constraints bind:
(IR : σ,θ,j) for σ = H,L and j = S,R.
(IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) for σ = H,L.









from the binding individual rationality
constraint for (σ,θ,j). This suggests, from the monotonicity constraint p(L,θ) ≥ p(H,θ)
and ∆CS > ∆CR, that a low-cost type may have an incentive to manipulate report from
H to L. Lemma 2 shows, if the rent an agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) obtains by reporting
truthfully is smaller than the rent he obtains by reporting (L,θ) (i.e. V (L,θ;H,θ)), the
regular regime holds.11 Figure 1 describes the binding incentive constraints in the regular
regime.





deserves some explanation since A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) will be used to de￿ne all diﬀerent
11In the proof of lemma 2, I show that V (L,θ;H,θ) ≥ V (L,θ;H,θ) holds and hence we can neglect
the manipulation from (H,θ) to (L,θ).
13regimes. Since an agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) may have an incentive to report (L,θ),w h e n
the principal chooses t(L,θ,y), she needs to take into account three aspects in general.




∆CR to an agent
with (σ,θ)=( L,θ) while satisfying his (ex post) individual rationality constraint. Second,




when he reports (L,θ).12
Third, t(L,θ,y) should minimize the rent that an agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) obtains by re-
porting (L,θ).I f0 <p (L,θ)=p(L,θ) < 1,t h eo p t i m a lt(L,θ,y) is simple and is given by
t(L,θ,y S)=C(θ,S) and ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+(1−￿L)t(L,θ,yL)=C(θ,R);o t h e r w i s e ,w eh a v e





can get a positive rent by reporting (L,θ), which is not optimal. Under
the optimal transfers, an agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) obtains only a rent equal to p(L,θ)∆CS
upon reporting (L,θ) since the principal can choose t(L,θ,yH) small enough and t(L,θ,y L)
large enough while satisfying ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,y L)=C(θ,R). Suppose now





for an agent with (σ,θ)=( L,θ) between the safe and the risky project, it is optimal to
allocate a maximal rent to the risky project conditional on that it does not leave any




. This way allows her to minimize the rent that the
agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) c a no b t a i nb yr e p o r t i n g(L,θ). Hence, the optimal transfers
are given by ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,y L)=C(θ,R) and t(L,θ,y S)=C(θ,S)+
p(L,θ)
p(L,θ) [∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR. Then, the rent that the agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) can obtain





I now consider the case in which task integration qualitatively aﬀects the binding
incentive constraints.
Lemma 3 Suppose A1, ∆CS > ∆CR,a n dM .
(i) If p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) holds, there exist countervail-
ing incentives such that the downward incentive constraint (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)) binds as
long as p(L,θ) < 1.
(ii) We can distinguish two regimes depending on whether or not the downward incen-
tive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) binds.
(ii) (a) (countervailing regime I) If p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≤
p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR holds, the following constraints bind:
(IR : σ,θ,j) for σ = H,L and j = S,R.
12It is easy to see that it is optimal to have V (L,θ : L,θ)=0 . V (L,θ : L,θ) > 0 implies U(L,θ) > 0.
But an increase in U(L,θ) increases U(L,θ) from the binding (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),w h i c hi nt u r nm a k e s
manipulating signal from H to L more attractive to a low-cost type with σ = H.
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Figure 1: Binding incentive constraints in the regular regime.
(IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),(IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),(IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)).
(ii) (b) (countervailing regime II) If A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR
holds, the following constraints bind:
(IR : L,θ,j) for j = S,R.
(IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),(IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),(IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)),
(IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)).
Given p(H,θ),a sp(L,θ) increases, a low-cost type with σ = H has a larger incentive to
manipulate his signal from H to L since the rent that a low-cost type with σ = L obtains
(i.e. U(L,θ) ≡ p(L,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR)i n c r e a s e sw i t hp(L,θ). Therefore, when the
diﬀerence between p(L,θ) and p(H,θ) is large enough (i.e. p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤
A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) holds), the lateral incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)) binds as
Lemma 3(ii)(a) and (ii) (b) state. This in turn can create two kinds of countervailing
incentives. First, as long as p(L,θ) < 1, the downward incentive constraint (IC :( L,θ) →
(L,θ)) binds. Otherwise, the principal can satisfy the lateral incentive constraint (IC :
(H,θ) → (L,θ)) at no cost by choosing for instance t(L,θ,y S)=C(θ,S) and t(L,θ,y H)
small enough and t(L,θ,yL) large enough. However, this strategy requires her to choose
￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,yL)13 larger than C(θ,R) to satisfy (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),
which violates (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)). Since giving a positive rent to a high-cost type
13It is given by (1 − p(L,θ))
£
￿Lt(L,θ,yH)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,yL) − C(θ,R)
⁄
= p(L,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+
∆CR.
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Figure 2: Binding incentive constraints in the countervailing regime I.
with σ = L is not optimal, (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)) binds and it is optimal to choose
￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,y L)=C(θ,R).
Second, as U(L,θ) increases, the rent that a low-cost type with σ = H obtains from
the binding lateral incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)) increases so much that the
downward incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) can bind. In this case, a high-cost
type with σ = H can get a positive information rent by announcing (H,θ).
I call the regime in which the lateral incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)) and
the downward incentive constraint (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)) bind while the other downward
incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) is slack the countervailing regime I and the
regime in which the lateral incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)) and the two down-
ward incentive constraints (IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) for σ = H,L bind the countervailing
regime II.F i g u r e2( ￿gure 3) describes the binding incentive constraints in the counter-
vailing regime I (countervailing regime II). Lemma 3 gives the condition under which each
regime exists. Since p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR holds
from the monotonicity constraint p(H,θ) ≥ p(H,θ), the countervailing regime I does exist.
From the binding individual rationality constraints (IR : L,θ,j) for j = S,R, a high-cost
type with σ = L can never get any information rent. By contrast, a high-cost type with
σ = H gets a positive information rent in the countervailing regime II.
Optimal contract
In o w￿nd the optimal contract. Note that in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the condition for
the existence of each regime is de￿ned with weak inequality such that the set of contracts
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Figure 3: Binding incentive constraints in the countervailing regime II.
belonging to each regime becomes a closed set. I ￿rst consider the optimal contract in
each regime starting by the regular regime.
Lemma 4 Under A1 and ∆CS > ∆CR, the optimal contract in the regular regime satis￿es




∆CR ≥ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) with equality.
Lemma 4 suggests that in order to look for the optimal contract in the regular regime,




∆CR = A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)), which are also included in the countervailing
regime I.
I now consider the countervailing regime II.
Lemma 5 Under A1 and ∆CS > ∆CR, in the countervailing regime II,
(i) It is optimal to have p(H,θ)=0 .
(ii) The optimal p(H,θ) is 0 if the following inequality holds;
￿Hy
H +( 1− ￿H)y








(∆CS − ∆CR). (6)









(iii) (no bias) If the constraint A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR does
not bind, the optimal contract under the countervailing regime II exhibits no bias in the










plays the role of
an (endogenous) reservation utility to a type-θ agent with σ = H s i n c eh ec a nm a -
nipulate his reports about the signal (from H to L) and the type to get that util-
ity. The reservation utility is zero for a high-cost type with σ = H while it is equal
to V (L,θ;H,θ)(= A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ))) > 0 for a low-cost type with σ = H.S i n c e
V (L,θ;H,θ) is larger than the expected cost diﬀerential between two types given p(H,θ)
(i.e. p(H,θ)∆CS +(1−p(H,θ))∆CR), as is usual in the literature on the type-dependent
reservation utility, the high-cost type￿s incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) binds
while the low-cost type￿s incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) is slack. Therefore,
p(H,θ) does not aﬀe c ta n yr e n ta n di ti so p t i m a lt oc h o o s ep(H,θ)=0 .
I now illustrate the trade-oﬀ determining the optimal p(H,θ) by examining the case of
p(L,θ)=1for θ ∈ Θ.N o t et h a tp(L,θ)=1implies V (L,θ;H,θ)(= A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) =
∆CS, which in turn implies that the contract should satisfy U(H,θ)=∆CS in order to
induce truth-telling of the agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ).C o n s i d e r￿rst p(H,θ)=1 .T h e n ,b y
choosing t(H,θ,yS)=C(θ,S), the principal can satisfy U(H,θ)=∆CS while leaving zero
rent to the high-cost type with σ = H.C o n s i d e rn o wp(H,θ)=0 . Then, she should choose
transfers satisfying ￿Ht(H,θ,y H)+(1−￿H)t(H,θ,y L)=C(θ,R)+∆CS in order to satisfy
U(H,θ)=∆CS and this in turns makes a high-cost type with σ = H obtain a rent equal to
∆CS−∆CR by announcing (H,θ). Therefore, a marginal decrease in p(H,θ) increases the
expected revenue by ν
2
'





t h ep r o j e c tc h o i c eo ft h el o w - c o s tt y p ew i t hσ = H, on the one hand, and increases the
expected cost by 1−ν
2 {∆CS − ∆CR} from leaving more rent to the high-cost type with
σ = H on the other hand. This trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction explains
the condition to choose p(H,θ)=0(i.e. (6)) in Lemma 5. Finally, Lemma 5 (iii) says
that if the optimal contract in the countervailing regime II is interior14, then the project
choice should be the same as the one in the benchmark in which the principal receives
the signal and in this case a high-cost type with σ = H gets a rent equal to ∆CS − ∆CR
while a low-cost type gets a rent equal to ∆CS regardless of σ.
I now consider the lateral regime without countervailing incentives.
Lemma 6 In the countervailing regime I,




( i i )T h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l eo p t i m a lc o n t r a c t s :
14By an interior contract, I mean a contract satisfying A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR
with a strict inequality.
18(a) (bias toward the safe project for the low-cost type)
p(L,θ)=p(H,θ)=1 ,t(σ,θ,y S)=C(θ,S);
p(H,θ)=0 ,￿ Ht(H,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿H)t(H,θ,yL)=C(θ,R).
(b) (bias toward the risky project for the high-cost type)
p(L,θ)=1 ,t(L,θ,y S)=C(θ,S)+∆CR;
p(L,θ)=p(H,θ)=0 ,￿ σt(σ,θ,yH)+( 1− ￿σ)t(σ,θ,y L)=C(θ,R).




p(H,θ)=0 ,￿ σt(σ,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿σ)t(σ,θ,yL)=C(θ,R).
In the countervailing regime I, a high-cost type gets no information rent and the
rent of the low-cost type with σ = H is determined by the lateral incentive constraint
(IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)).S i n c e p(H,θ) does not aﬀect any rent, it is optimal to choose
p(H,θ)=0while it is optimal to choose the minimum p(H,θ) that satis￿es the condi-
tion on A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) stated in Lemma 3 (ii)(b); this minium p(H,θ) is described in
Lemma 6(i).
The Lemma reveals that there are three possible optimal contracts in the counter-
vailing regime I. In the ￿rst case (i.e. Lemma 6 (ii)(a)), there is no distortion in project
choice with respect to the benchmark in which the principal receives the signal except for
(σ,θ)=( H,θ).W h e n (σ,θ)=( H,θ), the principal chooses the safe project instead of
the risky project and this bias toward the safe project can be optimal since it allows the
principal to reduce the rent abandoned to the high-cost type with σ = H because of the
countervailing incentives as was explained in the paragraph just before Lemma 6.
In the second case (i.e. Lemma 6 (ii)(b)), there is no distortion in project choice except
for (σ,θ)=( L,θ) and the principal chooses the risky project for that state. This bias
toward the risky project allows the principal to reduce the rent given to the low-cost type
with σ = L from ∆CS to ∆CR from the binding incentive constraint (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)),
which in turn reduces the rent given to the low-cost type with σ = H by the same amount
from the binding lateral incentive constraint (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)).
Finally, in the last case (i.e. Lemma 6 (ii)(c))15, there is no distortion in project choice
when σ = H while when σ = L the principal chooses the safe project with probability
p(L,θ)=
∆CR
∆CS and the risky project with probability 1 −
∆CR
∆CS f o rb o t ht y p e s . I nt h i s
case, a low-cost type with σ = L gets a rent equal to p(L,θ)(∆CS − ∆CR)+∆CR from
15This case arises when the monotonicity constraint p(L,θ) ≥ p(L,θ) binds as in the ￿rst case (lemma
6 (ii)(a)). It is slack in the second case (lemma 6 (ii)(b)).
19the binding (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)) while a low-cost type with σ = H gets a rent equal to
p(L,θ)∆CS = ∆CR from the binding (IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)). The reason why the latter
gets a smaller rent than the former is that if he reports σ = L, with probability 1−p(L,θ),
the principal chooses the risky project and in this case he does not get any rent since the
transfer depends on the match between the reported signal and the realized revenue yR.
Note that there is a regime change at p(L,θ)=
∆CR
∆CS;g i v e np(L,θ)=p and p(H,θ)=0 ,
if p<
∆CR
∆CS holds, we are in the regular regime since (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) binds and
(IC :( H,θ) → (L,θ)) and (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) are slack while, if p>
∆CR
∆CS holds, we are
in the countervailing regime II since (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) is slack and (IC :( H,θ) →
(L,θ)) and (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) bind such that U(H,θ)=p∆CS − ∆CR > 0.
L e m m a4t oL e m m a6s u g g e s tt h a tt h eo p t i m a lc o n t r a c ti so n ea m o n gt h ef o u rc a n -
didates (the one described in Lemma 5 (iii) and the three described in Lemma 6). The
following proposition shows that in fact, each of them can be the optimal contract de-
pending on the parameter values.
Proposition 2 Consider task integration and suppose that A1 holds and σ = H is bad
news (i.e. ∆CS > ∆CR).
( i )T h ep r i n c i p a l ￿ se x p e c t e dp r o ￿t is strictly lower than the one in the benchmark in
which the principal receives the signal.
(ii) The optimal contract has
(a) no bias in project choice if both ￿HyH+(1−￿H)yL−yS and yS−￿LyH−(1−￿L)yL
are large enough
(b) a bias toward the safe project for the low-cost type (p(H,θ)=1 )if ν is small
enough
(c) a bias toward the risky project for the high-cost type (p(L,θ)=0 )if (1 − ν) is
small enough






if ∆CS is large
enough with respect to ∆CS − ∆CR.
Proof. Since (i) is obvious, I prove only (ii). Let Π∗ denote the expected pro￿ti nt h e
benchmark in which the principal receives the signal. I compute the diﬀerence between
Π∗ and the pro￿t under task integration for each among the four candidates. First, when
there is no bias in project choice, the loss in pro￿ti se q u a lt o1
2(∆CS − ∆CR). Second,
when there is a bias toward the safe project for the low-cost type as described in Lemma
6 (ii)(a), the loss is ν
2
£
￿HyH +( 1− ￿H)yL − C(θ,R) − yS + C(θ,S)
⁄
. Third, when there
is a bias toward the risky project for the high-cost type as described in Lemma 6 (ii)(b),
20the loss is 1−ν
2
£
yS − Cv(θ,S) − ￿LyH − (1 − ￿L)yL + Cv(θ,R)
⁄
. Finally, when there is a






yS − C(θ,S) − ￿LyH − (1 − ￿L)yL + C(θ,R)
⁄
. The result in (ii) follows from
comparing the losses.
When the gain from having a good project match (￿HyH +( 1− ￿H)yL − yS and
yS −￿LyH −(1−￿L)yL) is large enough, it is optimal to have no distortion in the project
choice. Then, the contract described in Lemma 5 (iii) is optimal. In this case, a low-cost
type gets an information rent equal to ∆CS regardless of the signal he receives while a
high-cost type obtains a rent equal to ∆CS − ∆CR upon receiving σ = H. By contrast,
in the benchmark in which the principal obtains the signal, only a low-cost type gets a
rent and his rent is ∆CS if he receives σ = L and ∆CR if he receives σ = H. Therefore,
task integration generates a loss equal to 1
2(∆CS − ∆CR) with respect to the benchmark
by increasing the cost to obtain the signal.
Proposition 2 says, because of this loss, it can be optimal to introduce a bias toward
a safe or a risky project. There are three kinds of trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and
eﬃciency loss in terms of the distortion in project choice. First, when the probability of
having a low-cost type is small enough, it is optimal to choose the safe project for the
low-cost type regardless of the signal. This allows the principal to save the rent that a
high-cost type can obtain upon receiving σ = H when there is no bias. Second, when
the probability of having a high-cost type is small enough, it is optimal to choose the
risky project for the high-cost type regardless of the signal. This in particular allows the
principal to reduce the rent that a low-cost type obtains regardless of the signal from ∆CS
to ∆CR with respect to the case without bias. Finally, when ∆CS is large enough with
respect to ∆CS − ∆CR, it is optimal to introduce the same but small bias toward the
risky project for both types (i.e. 1 − p(L,θ)=
∆CS−∆CR
∆CS ). This small bias in particular
allows the principal to reduce the rent that the agent with σ = H obtains regardless of
the type by ∆CS − ∆CR with respect to the case without bias.
4E x t e n s i o n : n o c o m m i t m e n t
In this section, I extend the model to the case in which the principal cannot commit in
advance to a mechanism to induce the agent to transmit the signal σ. For instance, the
signal transmitted by the agent simply may not be contractible or the agent might move
21￿rst to in￿uence the principal￿s choice by transmitting information16.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
agent would decide which signal to release before the principal proposes an oﬀer. Note
￿rst that the principal￿s expected pro￿t is higher with commitment than without it since
with commitment, she can at least commit to the best contract without commitment.
Note also that under task separation, the agent in charge of evaluating the risky project
will truthfully release the signal even when the principal has no commitment power since
the agent always obtains zero rent.
From now on I consider task integration. As is written in section 2, I assume that the
shutdown is never optimal and that the agent has the option of terminating his relationship
with the principal at any time before incurring the production cost. In the special case
with ∆CS = ∆CR, it is easy to see that the agent will transmit the true signal regardless
of his type. Therefore, I consider the case with ∆CS 6= ∆CR. For expositional facility, I
call σ = H a good (bad) signal and σ = L a bad (good) signal from the agent￿s point of
view if ∆CS < ∆CR (if ∆CS > ∆CR). A good (bad) signal is denoted by σ = G (σ = B).
I study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in which the high-cost type always
truthfully releases his signal and the low-cost type truthfully releases the good signal
(σ = G).17 To de￿n et h eP B E ,Ii n t r o d u c es o m en o t a t i o n :z represents the probability
for the low-cost type to release b σ = B when he receives the bad signal (σ = B), ￿(b σ)
(respectively, ν(b σ)) represents the principal￿s revised prior about the probability of having
yR = yH (respectively, the probability of having θ = θ) conditional on receiving signal
b σ from the agent and {p(θ | b σ),t(θ,y| b σ)} is the mechanism that the principal proposes
after receiving b σ. Then, a PBE is de￿ned by:
{z,￿(σ),ν(σ),p(θ | σ),t(θ,y| σ)},
which satis￿es the following three conditions:
1) given {￿(σ),ν(σ),p(θ | σ),t(θ,y| σ)}, z maximizes the payoﬀ of the low-cost type
who received σ = B,
2) ￿(σ) and ν(σ) satisfy Bayes￿ rule,
3) given {z,￿(σ),ν(σ)}, p(θ | σ) and t(θ,y| σ) maximize the principal￿s payoﬀ.
16This framework is similar to the one chosen by Potters and Van Winden (1992) to study lobbying
under asymmetric information.
17It can be easily checked that in the equilibria of proposition 3 and proposition 4, the high-cost type
always truthfully releases his signal and the low-cost type truthfully releases the good signal.
224.1 When σ = H is good news
Consider ￿rst the case in which σ = H is good news. Then, there exists an equilibrium
in which the agent always transmits the true signal.
Proposition 3 Under A1 and when ∆CS ≤ ∆CR holds, in the absence of commitment,
there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the agent always transmits the true
signal σ.
Proof. With z =1 ,w eh a v e￿(σ)=￿σ, ν(σ)=ν.F r o mA 1 ,w h e nσ = H,i ti so p t i m a l
to have p(θ | H)=0and ￿Ht(θ,y H | H)+( 1− ￿H)t(θ,y L | H)=C(θ,R) and when
σ = L, it is optimal to have p(θ | L)=1and t(θ,yS | L)=C(θ,S).F u r t h e r m o r e , l e t
{t(θ,y| H)} satisfy the following:
￿Lt(θ,y
H | H)+( 1− ￿L)t(θ,y
L | H) ≤ C(θ,R).
Given the mechanism, a low-cost type with σ = L gets a rent equal to ∆CS if he transmits
L while he gets zero rent if he transmits H. Therefore, z =1is optimal given the
mechanism and we have a PBE in which the agent always transmits the signal.
The intuition of the above result is simple. If the agent expects the principal to make
the transfer under the risky project depend on the match between the reported signal and
the realized revenue such that a high (low) transfer is made if the match is good (bad),
then the agent has no incentive to transmit H when he received L.
4.2 When σ = H is bad news
Consider now the case in which σ = H is bad news. I have the following result:
Proposition 4 Under A1 and when ∆CS > ∆CR holds, in the absence of commitment,
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which the high-cost type always truthfully releases his
signal and the low-cost type truthfully releases σ = L, {z,￿(σ),ν(σ),p(θ | σ),t(θ,y| σ)},
are characterized by:
(i) There is no equilibrium in which the low-cost type always truthfully releases σ = H:
z<1.
(ii) ￿(H : z)=￿H; ν(H : z)= νz
1−ν+νz. p(θ | H)=0 , ￿Ht(θ,y H | H)+(1−￿H)t(θ,yL |
H)=C(θ,R).




1+ν−νz; ν(L : z)=
ν(2−z)
1+ν−νz.
There exists ν∗ with 0 < ν∗ < 1 such that:
23(a) For all ν ∈ (0,ν∗), there exists a unique equilibrium with z =0and, in this
equilibrium p(θ | L)=1 .
(b) For all ν ∈ [ν∗,1), there are multiple equilibria: for each z ∈ [0,z∗(ν)] with z∗(ν∗)=
0 and dz∗
dν > 0, there exists an equilibrium. The principal￿s payoﬀ is the largest with
z = z∗(ν). In this equilibrium, p(θ | L)=0and p(θ | L)=0or 1.18
It is easy to see that there is no PBE in which the low-cost type always truthfully
releases σ = H.S u p p o s e t h a t z =1 . Then, we have ￿(σ)=￿σ and ν(σ)=ν.T h i s
implies that p(θ | H)=0 , ￿Ht(θ,yH | H)+(1−￿H)t(θ,y L | H)=C(θ,R) and p(θ | L)=1
and t(θ,y S | L)=C(θ,S). Given the principal￿s response, the low-cost type obtains more
rent by transmitting L than by transmitting H when he received H.T h u s , t h e r e i s a
contradiction. When the principal receives σ = H, she knows for sure that the agent
received σ = H. Then, from A1, choosing the risky project is optimal.
For ν small, even though the low-cost type always manipulates the signal from H
to L, ￿(L) is close to ￿L. Hence, the principal will maintain the safe project when she
receives L and therefore the low-cost type always reports L regardless of the signal he
receives. Since the risky project is chosen only when the high-cost type receives H,t a s k
integration without commitment creates a bias toward the safe project with respect to
the benchmark in which the principal receives the signal.
For ν large, if the low-cost type always manipulates the signal from H to L, ￿(L)
is close to ￿. Furthermore we have ν(L) > ν. The two factors make it optimal for the
principal to introduce a bias toward the risky project when she receives L in that she
always chooses the risky project for the high-cost type (and furthermore it can be optimal
to choose the risky project for the low-cost type as well as proposition 4(iii)b shows).
Then, the low-cost type obtains the same rent regardless of the signal he releases. Thus,
releasing H with a positive probability can be an equilibrium.
Therefore, task integration without commitment creates both a bias toward the safe
project and a bias toward the risky project as does task integration with commitment
with respect to the benchmark in which the principal receives the signal. However, the
cost from lack of commitment can be very high since there are always some distortions
in information ￿ows and therefore the principal can never achieve the no-bias outcome
(i.e. retaining the risky project if and only if the signal is high) that she can achieve with
commitment. Furthermore, as Proposition 4(iii)b shows, surprisingly, the principal can
end up choosing the risky project with probability one.
18p(θ | L)=0if yS − C(θ,S) −
£
￿(L : z)yH +( 1− ￿(L : z))yL − C(θ,R)
⁄
< 0.
245 Applications and discussions
The results under task integration can provide an explanation for why good ￿rms can go
bad. For this application, I now suppose that there are two agents (a good agent and a
bad agent) and the principal knows whether his agent is good or bad. Each (good or bad)




with probability 1 − ν. In the case of the good agent, his production cost is given as




and j ∈ {S,R}. In the case of the bad agent, his
cost is given as follows: CB(θ,j) ≡ CG(θ,j)+c and CB(θ,j) ≡ CB(θ,j) − k∆Cj where
c>0 and k ∈ [0,1]. The type of each agent is his private information. Given a type θ
and a project, a bad agent￿s cost is strictly higher than a good agent￿s one. Therefore,
it is obvious that given a project choice, the principal￿s pro￿t is strictly higher when the
agent is good than when he is bad. Consider now the case in which the principal needs to
choose between the two projects. I am interested in comparing the principal￿s expected
pro￿t when the agent is good with the one when the agent is bad. Each agent is assumed
to receive the signal σ ∈ {G,B} with the same precision ξ.19 The next proposition shows
that the principal￿s pro￿t when the agent is bad can be larger than the one when the
agent is good:
Proposition 5 Suppose A1, commitment power, and ∆CS > ∆CR (i.e. σ = H is bad




, the principal￿s expected
pro￿t is higher when the agent is bad than when he is good for all c ∈ [0,c(k)) with
c(k) > 0.
Proof. Note ￿rst that under A1 and ∆CS > ∆CR, the principal￿s optimal project choice
in the benchmark in which she receives σ does not depend on whether the agent is good or
bad. Consider the case in which k =0 . First, in the benchmark in which she receives σ,
the reduction in her pro￿tw h e ns h ei sm a t c h e dw i t ht h eb a da g e n ti n s t e a do ft h eg o o do n e
is c. Second, if the agent is bad, there is no loss from task integration and the principal
achieves the pro￿t under the benchmark. Third, if the agent is good, then there is a loss
from task integration: let c(0) denote the minimum among all the four losses from task
integration that I derived in the proof of proposition 2. From the previous arguments,
when k =0 , the principal￿s expected pro￿t is higher when the agent is bad than when he
is good for c ∈ [0,c(0)).B yc o n t i n u i t y ,f o rs o m ek strictly positive, there exists c(k) > 0
19I can assume that the bad agent receives the signal with a lower precision than does the good agent
and can still obtain a result similar to that of proposition 5.




and c ∈ [0,c(k)), the principal￿s expected pro￿ti sh i g h e r
when the agent is bad than when he is good. k =1is impossible since when k =1 ,t h e
pro￿t is strictly higher with the good agent than with the bad agent for any c>0.
Example 1 If ￿HyH +(1−￿H)yL−yS and yS −￿LyH −(1−￿L)yL are large enough, for
any k ∈ [0,1) and for any c<c(k)=1−k
2 (∆CS − ∆CR),t h ep r i n c i p a l ￿ se x p e c t e dp r o ￿ti s
higher when the agent is bad than when he is good.
The above proposition provides a channel through which good ￿rms can go bad. In-
terpret the safe project as the current project which generates a ￿xed revenue and the
risky project as a new project generating an uncertain revenue. The good (bad) agent
represents a ￿rm with superior (inferior) technology. For this application, I assume that
the principal cannot change his current match with a good or bad agent.20 Although a
technologically superior ￿rm has a lower cost of production than the other in each project,
if the former￿s division has some vested interest (or a large rent) attached to the current
project, it can have diﬃculties in obtaining information relevant to project choice and
might have an expected pro￿t lower than that of the technologically inferior ￿rm. Fur-
thermore, it is natural to expect that the rent that the division obtains from the current
project increases as the project is more successful, which implies that a successful ￿rm
might suﬀer more from diﬃculties in obtaining information than an unsuccessful ￿rm
when the changes in business environment are adverse to the current project. In this
sense, my results suggest that today￿s success can plant a seed for tomorrow￿s failure.
As an illustration, consider IBM￿s core activity choice in the past. During the eighties,
IBM￿s core activity consisted of mainframe production while market demand was shifting
toward microcomputers. According to Friesen and Mills (1996, p. 88), IBM faced a serious
crisis in the nineties since it failed to make changes in a timely manner and exhibited
inertia. Our model suggests that the inertia could have resulted from the distortions in
information ￿ows from the mainframe division. In fact, the same authors mention that
division executives began to put the welfare of their own organizations above that of the
corporation as a whole and that this was manifested in the resistance of the mainframe
division to the introduction of new technology that might damage sales of its products
(pp. 128-29).
20As it will be clear in the examples (IBM and Kmart) that I give below, the agent can represent a
whole division. In this case, the principal can destroy the current division and build a new one only with
ap r o h i b i t i v ec o s t .
26Kmart (Kresge)￿s failure to adopt a computerized ordering system can be another
illustration. By 1973 when Kresge was the leader of the industry, it still used the an-
tiquated system of having managers at each of the company￿s 673 stores ￿ll out order
books by hand and mail in each day￿s invoices to headquarters. That year, several Kresge
executives proposed replacing the order books with computers. However, it provoked fu-
rious opposition from store managers who viewed computerized ordering as an attempt
by headquarters to take power away from the ￿eld and opposing people argued that a
computerized system would make the company lose store managers￿ expertise in manag-
ing stocks. (Ortega 1998, p. 121). Note however that proposition 2 and 4 suggest that
distortions in information ￿ows can generate not only a bias toward the current or safe
project but also a bias toward the risky project.
My results also provide an insight about path dependency. Suppose that there are
three projects (j = A,B,C)w i t h∆A < ∆C < ∆B where ∆j ≡ C(θ,j) − C(θ,j) > 0.I
consider a two-period model in which the principal makes a choice between A and B at
t =1and then between the one chosen at t =1and C at t =2 . Assume that the principal
cannot commit to a long-term contract and that C is a risky project while the revenue
from the project chosen at t =1is known at t =2 . Then, the previous analysis implies
that if A was retained at t =1 , the agent will release truthfully the signal regarding the
pro￿tability of project C at t =2without any extra compensation while if B was retained
at t =1 , the principal cannot receive the true signal without any extra compensation.
Although my description of task separation is too stylized, the comparison between
task separation and integration sheds light on the separation of day-to-day operating
decisions from long-term strategic decisions, stressed by Chandler (1966) and Williamson
(1975) as the major characteristic of the M-form structure. Under the M-form structure,
day-to-day operating decisions are assigned to functional divisions and long-term strategic
decisions are assigned to the general oﬃce while, under the U-form structure, functional
executives have responsibility for both decisions. The U-form structure suﬀered from
distortions in strategic information ￿ows since functional executives became advocates
representing the interests of their respective divisions, as Williamson notes. One can
improve information ￿ows by assigning the long-term strategic decision to general oﬃce
which does not have any vested interest accruing from operational tasks.
However, in reality, task separation has some drawbacks. First of all, agents do not
have equal access to information. For instance, a marketing division has better access
to information about demand while an R&D division has better access to information
about new technology. Thus, the elite staﬀ has some disadvantage compared to divisions
27in terms of access to information. In other words, the precision of the signal can be lower
(or the cost of getting the signal can be higher) under task separation than under task
integration. Then, task integration will strictly dominate task separation when the signal
favoring the adoption of the risky project is good news. Second, the fact that the agent
in charge of project evaluation under task separation has no information rent can have its
own negative consequence when the principal has to rely on the agent￿s initiative to get
information because she lacks commitment power and information acquisition is costly.
Then, it is easy to see that the agent will take the initiative only under task integration.
Proposition 5 also suggests that in a buyer-seller relationship (when the principal can
choose between a good and a bad agent), it can be optimal for the buyer (for instance, the
department of defense) to buy from a seller (a defense contractor) with inferior technology
instead of buying from a seller with superior technology when the buyer should choose
between a project of which the surplus is known and a new and risky project of which the
surplus is uncertain. This happens when the seller with superior technology has a vested
interest in the ￿rst project. I showed that the distortions in project choice can arise even
if the buyer￿s surplus under each project is contractible. The distortions will be more
severe if the surplus is not contractible.
For simplicity, I considered a model ￿ la Baron and Myerson (1982) in which the
agent￿s cost is his private information. As an alternative, it would be interesting to
consider a model ￿ la Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) in which the agent￿s realized cost can
be observed by the principal but the cost is determined by his eﬀort (moral hazard) and
his cost parameter (adverse selection). In this setup, I still expect that when the signal
favoring the adoption of the risky project is bad news from the agent￿s point of view,
there will be countervailing incentives due to the endogenous type-dependent reservation
utility. However, the principal can choose the power of the incentive scheme under each
project21 in order to aﬀect the agent￿s incentive to transmit the signal. I conjecture that in
this case, it would be optimal for the principal to choose a low-powered (a high-powered)
i n c e n t i v es c h e m ef o rt h es a f ep r o j e c t( f o rt h er i s k yp r o j e c t ) .
6 Concluding remarks
When agents have rents accruing from a current project, they might try to resist the
adoption of a new and risky project by misrepresenting information favorable to the new
21An incentive scheme is a menu of cost reimbursement rules and the power of a reimbursement rule
increases as the fraction of the cost overrun that the agent should bear increases.
28project. I tried to capture this situation by distinguishing the information which generates
an information rent and the information which aﬀects the adoption of the new project.
The utility that the agent can obtain by misrepresenting the information favorable to
the new project becomes an endogenous type-dependent reservation utility and this can
generate countervailing incentives making a right project choice costly. The results can
oﬀer an explanation for why good ￿rms can go bad and a rational for the separation
of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions. Although I mainly
applied the model to organizations, it can also be adapted to buyer-seller situations (in
particular, procurement). It would be interesting to extend the model to include both
adverse selection and moral hazard in order to investigate the relationship between the
power of the incentive scheme and information ￿ows. Another interesting extension would
be to study the relationship between the agent￿s incentive to build reputation and infor-
mation ￿ows in a dynamic setting.22
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) The proof is standard; from summing (IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) and (IC :( σ,θ) →
(σ,θ)), we obtain the monotonicity constraint. p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ)
(ii) I below show that the optimal contract conditional on p(L,θ) ≤ p(H,θ) and
p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ) satis￿es p(L,θ)=p(H,θ): hence, we can neglect p(L,θ) <p (H,θ).
Suppose p(L,θ) ≤ p(H,θ).C o n s i d e r￿rst the case in which the agent can lie only about
θ. Then, it is obvious to see that given σ, the high cost type￿s individual rational-
ity constraint (IR : σ,θ,j) binds and the low cost type￿s incentive compatibility con-
straint (IC :( σ,θ) → (σ,θ)) binds such that the low cost type can get a rent equal to
p(σ,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR. p(L,θ) ≤ p(H,θ) implies that a low cost type with σ = L
gets a smaller rent than a low cost type with σ = H. In what follows, I ￿rst neglect all the
other constraints, show that the optimal contract conditional on p(L,θ) ≤ p(H,θ) and
p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ) satis￿es p(L,θ)=p(H,θ) and then show that when p(L,θ)=p(H,θ)
holds, the other constraints are in fact slack.
Let p(H,θ)=p be given. If I neglect all the other constraints, A1 and p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ)
imply that it is optimal to have (i) p(L,θ)=1(ii) p(H,θ)=p (i.e. the minimum
p(H,θ) satisfying p(H,θ) ≥ p(H,θ)) (iii) p(L,θ)=p (i.e. the maximum p(L,θ) satisfying











31Then, the principal can satisfy all the other constraints at no cost by using the above
transfers and by choosing t(σ,θ,y σ) large and t(σ,θ,yb σ) small (with σ 6= b σ). Therefore, the
optimal contract conditional on p(L,θ) ≤ p(H,θ) and p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ) satis￿es p(L,θ)=
p(H,θ).
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider ￿rst the case in which the agent can lie only about θ.T h e n , o n l y t h e l o w
cost type gets a rent which is equal to p(σ,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR as is shown in the
proof of Lemma 1. Note that a low cost type with σ = L gets a higher rent than a low
cost type with σ = H because of p(L,θ) ≥ p(H,θ).
Consider now the possibility that a low cost type can lie about both θ and σ.G i v e n
p(L,θ) ≥ p(H,θ), a low cost type with σ = H may have an incentive to announce σ = L.
Suppose ￿r s tt h a ta na g e n tw i t h(σ,θ)=( H,θ) announces (L,θ). Then, with probability




. However, with probability 1 − p(L,θ),t h er i s k yp r o j e c ti sc h o s e na n dt h e
payment he receives depends on the realization of the state. By increasing t(L,θ,y L) and









Therefore, V (L,θ : H,θ)=p(L,θ)∆CS.
Suppose now that an agent with (σ,θ)=( H,θ) announces (L,θ).G i v e np(L,θ),l e t
t(L,θ,y) be such that
U (L,θ) ≡ p(L,θ)
£




￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿L)t(L,θ,y L) − C(θ,R)
⁄
= p(L,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR,
(7)
where t(L,θ,yS) ≥ C(θ,S) and ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+(1−￿L)t(L,θ,y L) ≥ C(θ,R) must hold to
satisfy the individual rationality constraints. The principal wants to choose t(L,θ,y) to
maintain V (L,θ : L,θ)=0and at the same time to minimize V (L,θ : H,θ) given by
V (L,θ : H,θ) ≡ p(L,θ)
£








Then, by increasing t(L,θ,y L) and decreasing t(L,θ,y H), the principal can satisfy ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+
(1 − ￿L)t(L,θ,yL)=C(θ,R) and at the same time ￿Ht(L,θ,yH)+( 1− ￿H)t(L,θ,y L) <










∆CR ≥ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) holds, V (H,θ : H,θ) ≥ V (L,θ :













where the principal should choose t(σ,θ,y σ) large and t(σ,θ,yb σ) (with σ 6= b σ) small. Al-




∆CR ≥ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) and p(σ,θ) ≥ p(σ,θ) hold strictly, the prin-
cipal can achieve the same pro￿t by choosing transfers satisfying ￿σt(σ,θ,y H)+( 1−
￿σ)t(σ,θ,yL) <C (θ,R).
Proof of Lemma 3










∆CR. Therefore, a low cost type with σ = H has an incentive
to report (L,θ).
Given p(H,θ),l e tt(H,θ,y) be such that













where t(H,θ,y S) ≥ C(θ,S) and ￿Ht(H,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿H)t(H,θ,yL) ≥ C(θ,R) must hold
to satisfy the individual rationality constraints. Then, the principal wants to choose
t(H,θ,y) to minimize V (H,θ : H,θ),g i v e nb y
V (H,θ : H,θ)=p(H,θ)max
'




0,￿ Ht(H,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿H)t(H,θ,y L) − C(θ,R)
“
.
By choosing t(H,θ,yS)=C(θ,S) and ￿Ht(H,θ,yH)+(1− ￿H)t(H,θ,yL)=C(θ,R),t h e
principal can give a rent p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR to the low-cost type while making
23If p(σ,θ)=0 ,t h e np(σ,θ)=0from the monotonicity constraint. Then, V (σ,θ : σ,θ)=∆CR.
Therefore, t(σ,θ,yS) is irrelevant and ￿σt(σ,θ,y H)+( 1− ￿σ)t(σ,θ,yL)=C(θ,R) is optimal.
33V (H,θ : H,θ)=0 . Therefore, if A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≤ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR,t h e
principal can satisfy (IC :( H,θ) → (H,θ)) at no cost. However, if A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) >
p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR holds, then there are countervailing incentives such that a
high cost type with σ = H can get a rent equal to V (H,θ : H,θ)=A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) −
p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR] − ∆CR > 0.


















where a ∈ [0,∆CS], b ∈ [0,∆CR] and p(H,θ)a +(1− p(H,θ))b = A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)).T h e
























where U(H,θ)=A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) − p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR] − ∆CR and b satis￿es b ≥ 0
and p(H,θ)∆CS +( 1− p(H,θ))b = A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)). Note that the principal should
choose t(σ,θ,y σ) large and t(σ,θ,yb σ) (with σ 6= b σ) small in order to minimize the agent￿s
incentive to misrepresent σ. Note also that in the optimal transfers in both regimes, the
downward incentive constraint (IC :( L,θ) → (L,θ)) binds in that ￿Lt(L,θ,y H)+( 1−
￿L)t(L,θ,y L)=C(θ,R).
Proof of Lemma 4







∆CR for σ = H,L.




∆CR ≥ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) is
slack. Then, from A1, it is optimal to have p(L,θ)=1and p(H,θ)=0 . However, this
violates the constraint, which is contradictory.
Proof of Lemma 5
Under the countervailing regime I, from the optimal transfers in Lemma 3, the rents








U(H,θ)=A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) − p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR] − ∆CR.
(i) Since p(H,θ) does not aﬀect any rent, from A1, it is optimal to have p(H,θ)=0 .




















0,A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) − p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR] − ∆CR
“
.









￿HyH +( 1− ￿H)yL − C(θ,R)
⁄
+ 1−ν









￿HyH +( 1− ￿H)yL − C(θ,R)
⁄
otherwise.
Therefore, if (6) holds, it is optimal to have p(H,θ)=0 . If (6) does not hold, as long as





/[∆CS − ∆CR]); otherwise, p(H,θ)=1is optimal.
(iii) Suppose that the constraint A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR













































35In addition, the monotonicity constraint p(L,θ) ≥ p(L,θ) must be satis￿ed. There are
three candidate solutions; p(L,θ)=p(L,θ)=1or p(L,θ)=p(L,θ)=0or p(L,θ)=1and
p(L,θ)=0 .G i v e nt h a tp(H,θ)=0and p(H,θ)=0or 1, the only one among the three
which strictly satis￿es the constraint A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≥ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR
is p(L,θ)=1and p(H,θ)=0 . In this case, the optimal transfers are as described in
Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 6









(i) Note ￿rst that p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≤ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+
∆CR implies ∆CR ≤ A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≤ ∆CS since p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≥ ∆CR
and p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤ ∆CS hold. As p(H,θ) does not aﬀect any rent, from
A1, it is optimal to choose the minium p(H,θ) satisfying p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR ≤
A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ)) ≤ p(H,θ)[∆CS − ∆CR]+∆CR. This implies p(H,θ)=0and p(H,θ)=
A(p(L,θ),p(L,θ))−∆CR
∆CS−∆CR , which also satisfy the monotonicity constraint p(H,θ) ≤ p(H,θ).






























































∆CS−∆CR . The solution of this program satis￿es p(L,θ) >
p(L,θ) only when the ￿rst-order derivative with respect to p(L,θ) is positive while the
one with respect to p(L,θ) is negative and in this case we have p(L,θ)=1 ,p(L,θ)=0 ,
which implies p(H,θ)=0 . Consider now the case in which p(L,θ)=p(L,θ) holds
36(i.e. the monotonicity constraint binds). Then, A(p(L,θ)) = p(L,θ)∆CS, implying that
∆CR/∆CS ≤ p(L,θ) ≤ 1.I ft h e￿rst-order derivative with respect to p(L,θ) is positive,
we have p(L,θ)=1 ;o t h e r w i s e ,w eh a v ep(L,θ)=∆CR/∆CS.I nt h e￿rst case, we have
p(H,θ)=1 ,p(H,θ)=0while in the second case, we have p(H,θ)=0 .T h e o p t i m a l
transfers are as described in Lemma 6. Note that the principal has enough degree of
freedom to satisfy V (b σ,b θ : σ,θ) ≤ U(σ,θ) for any (b σ,b θ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
I already proved that z<1.W h e nb σ = H,w eh a v e :
￿(H : z)=￿H for any z; ν(H : z)=
νz
1 − ν + νz
≤ ν.
Therefore from ν(H : z) ≤ ν and A1, it is optimal to have p(θ | H)=0 , ￿Ht(θ,yH |
H)+( 1− ￿H)t(θ,y L | H)=C(θ,R).





















1 − ν(L : z)
(∆CS − ∆CR).
In o t et h a t∂Π
∂ν < 0, ∂Π
∂z > 0 and yS−C(θ,S)−
£




I have the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 (i) When Π(ν,0) > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium with z =0 .
(ii) When Π(ν,0) = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium with z =0 .
(iii) When Π(ν,0) < 0, for each z ∈ [0,z∗(ν)] with dz∗
dν > 0, there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. (i) When Π(ν,0) > 0 and z =0 , it is optimal to have p(θ | L)=1and
t(θ,y S | L)=C(θ,S) for θ ∈ Θ.T h u s ,z =0i st h eu n i q u eb e s tr e s p o n s ef o rt h el o w - c o s t
type.
(ii) If Π(ν,0) = 0 and z =0 ,i ti so p t i m a lt oc h o o s ep(θ | L)=1and any p(θ | L) ∈
[0,1]. The optimal transfers are t(θ,y S | L)=C(θ,S)+∆CR + p(θ | L)(∆CS − ∆CR),
t(θ,y S | L)=C(θ,S) and ￿Lt(θ,y H | L)+( 1− ￿L)t(θ,y L | L)=C(θ,R).I n t h i s c a s e ,
z =0is the unique best response for p(θ | L) > 0 and one among the best responses for
37p(θ | L)=0 . There cannot be any other equilibrium with z>0.I fz>0,i ti so p t i m a lt o
choose p(θ | L)=p(θ | L)=1 . However, in this case, z =0is the unique best response
for the low-cost type as in the proof of (i).
(iii) If z is such that Π(ν,z) < 0, it is optimal to have p(θ | L)=0 . p(θ | L)=1if
yS − C(θ,S) −
£
￿(L : z)yH +( 1− ￿(L : z))yL − C(θ,R)
⁄
> 0;o t h e r w i s e ,p(θ | L)=0 .I f
p(θ | L)=0and p(θ | L)=1 ,i ti so p t i m a lt oc h o o s et(θ | L)=C(θ,R) and t(θ | L)=
C(θ,S)+∆CR.I fp(θ | L)=0=p(θ | L),i ti so p t i m a lt oc h o o s et(θ | L)=C(θ,R) for
θ ∈ Θ. Since, in both cases, the low-cost type has the same rent regardless of whether
he reports H or L,e a c hz ∈ [0,z∗(ν)] constitutes an equilibrium, where z∗ is de￿ned by
Π(ν,z∗) ≡ 0.S i n c e∂Π
∂ν < 0 and ∂Π
∂z > 0 hold, we have dz∗
dν > 0. ¥
The result of proposition 4(iii) follows from the previous Lemma.
38